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This paper extends the theory of network competition between telecommunications operators
by allowing receivers to derive a surplus from receiving calls (call externality) and to a®ect
the volume of communications by hanging up (receiver sovereignty). We investigate the extent
to which receiver charges can lead to an internalization of the calling externality. When the
receiver charge and the termination (access) charge are both regulated, there exists an e±cient
equilibrium. E±ciency requires a termination discount.
When reception charges are market determined, it is optimal for each operator to set the
prices for emission and reception at their o®-net costs. For an appropriately chosen termination
charge, the symmetric equilibrium is again e±cient.
Lastly, we show that network-based price discrimination creates strong incentives for con-
nectivity breakdowns, even between equal networks.
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1.1 Motivation
The deregulation of telecommunications, the most advanced among network industries,
leads to new forms of competition. Operators compete for retail customers through so-
phisticated and discriminatory pricing while, at the wholesale level, their interconnection
by and large remains regulated. The small literature on this new form of competitive
environment1 has neglected the facts that call receivers derive a utility from calls (call
externality) and furthermore can a®ect volume by hanging up (receiver sovereignty). The
purpose of this paper is to extend our understanding of network competition to environ-
ments with call externalities and receiver sovereignty in which ¯rms can charge customers
for receiving calls.
The operators' practice of charging their customers both for emission and for reception
is usually referred to as the \receiver pays principle" (RPP). Reception charges play an
increasingly important role in the case of mobile phones. The receiver pays principle is
for example applied to mobile phone reception in the United States, Canada, and Hong
Kong, as well as for international roaming on GSM mobile networks. Reception charges
similarly play a key role in the new Internet economy, as both sides of the markets (e.g.
dial-up customers and websites) are charged for the capacity and usage of their connection
with Internet Service Providers or backbones.
Enriching the existing analysis to account for the existence of receiver surplus and
sovereignty serves more than a descriptive purpose, though. On the positive side, recep-
tion charges alter the operators' competitive strategies. On the normative side, the joint
determination of communications services by four parties (caller, receiver, and their oper-
ators) raises the question of whether proper incentives are in place for the maximization
of joint surplus.
1.2 Overview of the analysis
To provide a roadmap for our analysis, it is convenient to introduce some notation. Two
symmetrically di®erentiated networks compete in nonlinear prices for subscribers. A
network i subscriber with outgoing volume q and incoming volume ~ q is charged (without
loss of generality in our model)
Ti(q; ~ q)=Fi + piq + ri~ q;
where Fi is the monthly subscriber charge, pi is the per unit usage price and ri the per unit
reception charge. We let c0 denote a network's marginal cost of terminating calls, a the
reciprocal access charge paid by the originating network to the terminating network, and
c>c 0 the total (origination plus termination) marginal cost of communications. Last,
let ®1 and ®2 denote the two networks' market shares (®1 + ®2 = 1).
1See Armstrong (1998, 2000), Carter-Wright (1999,2000), Cherdron (2000), Dessein (1999 a, b), Gans-
King (1999), Hahn (2000) and La®ont-Rey-Tirole (1998 a, b).
2Consumers derive a surplus both from calling and from being called. These surpluses
in general di®er and furthermore may be state contingent.
Part 1: regulated or contractually determined reception charges
Suppose that the reception charges (r1;r 2) are regulated or else contractually agreed
upon by the two operators before they wage competition in monthly fees and calling
charges.
We ¯rst conduct the following thought experiment: Suppose the caller always deter-
mines the volume of communication. That is, either the receiver is not sovereign (i.e. is
not allowed to hang up) or the reception charge is su±ciently low (relative to the caller's
charge) that the receiver does not ¯nd it advantageous to hang up.
The inelastic demand for call reception implies that a network's reception charge has
no incentive e®ect. And so, from the operator-subscriber pair's viewpoint, only the sum
fFi + ri~ qg matters, not its composition.
Our ¯rst insight is that, while a network's reception charge does not impact its pro¯t
given its rival's competitive o®er, reception charges do matter. Indeed, we show that
network i's equilibrium usage (calling) charge is equal to its \strategic marginal cost",
namely:
pi =[ c + ®j(a ¡ c0)] ¡ ®irj;
where, recall, c is the (industry's) marginal cost of a call, ®i is network i's market share,
(a ¡ c0) the access charge markup (the di®erence between the access charge and the
termination cost) and rj is network j's reception price. An average call originating on
network i costs [c + ®j(a ¡ c0)] when the access markup (or discount) on the fraction
®j of calls that terminate o®-net is accounted for. To obtain network i's perceived or
strategic marginal cost, one subtracts the increase rj in the monthly fee of the fraction ®i
of consumers who subscribe to network i, that network i can a®ord implementing without
losing market share.
To see this, consider an increase in the volume of calls from network i to network
j. This increase has two opposite e®ects on the utility of network j's consumers. Their
surplus increases because they receive more calls. However, they pay for receiving these
extra calls. We call the ¯rst e®ect a direct externality and the second a pecuniary exter-
nality. Only pecuniary externalities matter. When network i lowers its price, the volume
of calls received by consumers increases by the same amount regardless of their network
a±liation, and therefore direct externalities are the same for all consumers. Pecuniary
externalities result in a decrease in the perceived marginal cost c+®j(a¡c0)¡®irj. That
is, an increase in network j's reception charge makes it more desirable for network i to
expand output.
Next, for a given symmetric reception charge r, we ask, does a symmetric equilibrium
exist? We show that, if the reception charge is in the vicinity of the access charge discount
(c0¡a), an equilibrium indeed exists. In contrast, when the reception charge substantially
diverges from the access charge discount and networks are close substitutes, an equilibrium
fails to exist; that is, competition is unstable. These results generalize the analysis in
La®ont-Rey-Tirole (1998a), which ruled out reception charges (r = 0) and showed that,
3with close substitutes, network competition is stable only if the access charge is in the
vicinity of the termination cost.
Last, and on the normative side, we investigate the relationship between the compet-
itive equilibrium and the second-best (Ramsey) optimum. Letting ¯ denote the ratio of
the marginal utilities of the caller and the receiver, second-best e±ciency requires that






Given that, in a symmetric equilibrium,
p = c +
a ¡ c0 ¡ r
2
from the above formula, the e±cient outcome obtains when r = c0 ¡a (so an equilibrium
exists) and




That is, termination is priced at a discount, and this discount is steeper, the higher the
receiver's marginal utility from receiving calls.
Last the ¯ction of caller-determined volume (our thought experiment), while open
to the criticism that receivers are actually sovereign, turns out to be very useful, as we
provide conditions under which it is still valid when receivers are allowed to hang up.
Part 2: market determined reception charges
Next, we assume that reception charges, just like monthly fees and calling charges,
are set noncooperatively by the operators instead of being determined contractually or
chosen by a regulator. In the absence of uncertainty about marginal utilities, a potential
indeterminacy of equilibria arises: Over the range of parameters for which the volume
is determined by the caller, only fFi + ri~ qg matters, not its composition, as we have
seen. And so, there might be a range of (nonequivalent) equilibria. We make the model
more realistic and actually simplify it by letting the marginal utilities of communications
be random (the utility of an extra minute of communication is state or time-of-the-day
contingent). With wide enough supports for marginal utilities, both the calling and the
reception charges have an incentive e®ect and therefore are determinate.
First, we show that, in a symmetric equilibrium, the usage and reception charges are
set equal to the \o®-net cost" of calls and call reception, respectively:
p = c +( a ¡ c0)
and
r =( c0 ¡ a):
4That is, even though the networks have equal market shares in a symmetric equilibrium,
each network sets prices for a subscriber's outgoing and incoming tra±cs at the marginal
costs that it would incur if all other subscribers belonged to the rival network.
Second, when the randomness in the marginal utilities vanishes and provided that the
access charge markup is larger than ¡¯c=(1 + ¯), an equilibrium exists. The Ramsey
optimum can then be approximated through the level of the access discount determined
above. This latter result relies on a ¯xed ratio of marginal utilities (and thus in partic-
ular on the noise vanishing); more generally, one instrument (the access charge) cannot
simultaneously adjust the incentives of both sides (caller, receiver) to internalize the other
side's surplus.
Part 3: network-based price discrimination
Last, we allow networks to di®erentiate their emission and reception charges according
to whether the communication is on- or o®-net. In the presence of network-based discrim-
ination, we need to separate the market for on-net calls and the market for o®-net calls. In
the former market, regardless of the introduction of reception charges, each network fully
internalizes the externalities on callers and receivers. In contrast, in the latter market,
the o®-net caller and receiver charges a®ect the welfare of consumers on the rival network
and are therefore subject to strategic manipulations.
Intuitively, a network has an incentive to charge a high o®-net emission price if the
receivers on the other network bene¯t almost as much from communications as the callers.
Conversely, a network has an incentive to charge a high o®-net receiver price if the receivers
derive little utility from being called, since communications then bene¯t mainly the callers
on the rival network. We provide su±cient conditions for these incentives to lead to a
de facto connectivity breakdown between the networks. The logic of the connectivity
breakdown here di®ers from the standard one emphasized in the network externalities
literature2 and stressing the incentive of a dominant player (characterized by a large
installed base or a cost superiority) to reinforce dominance by reducing connectivity.
Here, connectivity breakdowns occurs even with symmetric operators.
Finally, we show that, under an appropriate regulation of the reception charge, there
exist equilibria in which both on-net and o®-net charges are optimal. Furthermore, there
exists an equilibrium that yields the monopoly pro¯t and yet maximizes social welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the framework of analysis,
introduces the relevant concepts and notation and derives the social optimum benchmark.
Section 3 analyzes competition in nonlinear prices in the absence of network-based price
discrimination and for regulated reception charges, and then Section 4 studies market
determined reception charges. Section 5 performs similar analysis with network-based
price discrimination. Section 6 concludes.
2See, e.g., Katz-Shapiro (1985) and Cr¶ emer et al. (2000).
51.3 Literature review
After investigating the British telephone industry, Oftel (1998) concluded that the price of
calls from ¯xed networks to mobile phones was too high and envisioned price regulation.
Indeed, with the caller pays principle (CPP), there might be little competitive pressure
on the termination charge that a mobile phone operator can demand for terminating calls
originated in the ¯xed network and the resulting high charges hurt the consumers of the
¯xed network. Opposing Oftel's proposed price regulation, Doyle and Smith (1998) o®er
instead to apply the receiver pays principle (RPP), by which mobile operators charge
their own customers for receiving calls while callers pay a uniform per minute charge,
e.g. the local call charge, regardless of where the calls terminate. They study a model
with a monopoly ¯xed-link network and a duopoly of mobile operators. They ¯rst study
CPP, assuming that each mobile network sets its own termination charge to be paid by
the ¯xed network. This situation leads to a strong form of double marginalization on
¯xed-to-mobile calls (all the more that receivers are assumed not to derive surplus from
being called). Turning to RPP, they show that mobile operators compete on reception
charges to attract customers, which leads to a lower total charge of a ¯xed-to-mobile call
as well as increased usage.
Kim and Lim (2000), as we do, address the question of how the RPP may help with
the internalization of the call externalities when subscribers derive utility from receiving
calls.3 They consider two models without regulation of the access charge and the reception
charge and with linear, unregulated pricing of calls. Their ¯rst model is a monopoly model.
The introduction of a linear receiver charge decreases the perceived marginal cost of a
call for the network and therefore leads to a lower price of a call. However, the e®ect
on the total price (call price plus reception charge) and on welfare depends on how the
price elasticity of demand varies with price. In the second model, they introduce call
externalities in the La®ont, Rey and Tirole (1998a) model and assume that the access
charge is set cooperatively by the networks before competing in linear prices. A network
operator charges reception to all consumers (both his own subscribers and the subscribers
of the other network) for calls initiated on his own network. In contrast, we assume that
each operator sets reception charges for his own customers. Again, they show that the
calling price decreases with the RPP but that the access charge is higher with the RPP,
with ambiguous results on welfare.
DeGraba (2000) looks at a model with call externalities and network-based price dis-
crimination and argues that the bill-and-keep policy (zero access charges) leads to e±cient
pricing in a symmetric case where the origination and termination costs are equal and the
called party and the calling party bene¯t equally from a phone call.
3Littlechild (1977) suggests that these externalities can be internalized by cooperation between parties.




We extend the analysis of network competition in La®ont, Rey and Tirole (LRT,
1998a, b) in two respects: Receivers obtain positive utility from receiving calls and ¯rms
can charge receivers for reception.
There are two operators (suppliers, networks), i =1 ;2, located at the two extremes of
an Hotelling line of length one (x1 =0 ;x 2 = 1). Consumers are di®erentiated along the
Hotelling line. A consumer located at x and selecting network i incurs \transportation
cost" tjx ¡ xij.
The utility of a consumer with income y located at x and joining network i is given
by
y + v0 ¡ tjx ¡ xij + u(q)+~ u(~ q)
where u(q) is the utility from calls placed by the consumer and ~ u(~ q) represents the util-
ity from received calls.4 We assume that these utility functions u(¢) and ~ u(¢) are twice
continuously di®erentiable, with u0 > 0;u 00 < 0; e u0 > 0;e u00 < 0, which implies that de-
mand functions are di®erentiable. u(q) and ~ u(q) can be thought of as the caller's and
receiver's surpluses attached to a representative call (lasting q minutes). We assume that
the receiver's marginal surplus from receiving a call is nonnegative.
We consider four di®erent cases depending on whether network-based (on-net / o®-
net) price discrimination is allowed, and on whether the volume of calls is determined
only by callers or jointly by callers and receivers.
a) Price discrimination: In the absence of network-based price discrimination (Sections
3 and 4), network i o®ers a three-part tari® fFi;p i;r ig. Fi is the monthly subscriber
charge, pi is the (caller's) usage price, and ri represents the per-unit price that
network i's consumers pay for the calls received.
Under network-based discrimination (Section 5), network i o®ers a ¯ve-part tari®,
fFi;p i; ^ pi;r i; ^ rig. Here, ^ ri represents the price that a network i's consumer pays for
receiving calls originating on network j 6= i, while ri is the reception charge for
on-net calls. Similarly, pi and ^ pi refer to per-unit charges for calls that terminate
on- and o®-net, respectively.
b) Demand function: We ¯rst make the standard assumption that callers determine
the volume. Letting q(:) denote the caller's demand function, given by u0(q(p)) = p,
the volume of calls placed by a customer of network i is given by q(pi) in the absence
4The constant v0 in the utility function for a consumer who has joined a network ensures that all
consumers will always choose to join one of the two networks if v0 is high enough.
7of discrimination, and by q(pi) and q(^ pi) in the case of discrimination. Let v(p)b e




We then consider the case in which receivers are sovereign, i.e., callers and receivers
jointly determine the volume. Consider a representative caller-receiver pair. In
the absence of discrimination, the volume of calls from (the caller's) network i to
(the receiver's) network j(= 1;2) is given by minfq(pi); ~ q(rj)g where the receiver's
demand function is given by ~ u0(~ q(r)) = r. Under discrimination, the volume of calls,
if both belong to network i is given by minfq(pi); ~ q(ri)g and the volume of calls,
if the caller belongs to network i and the receiver to network j 6= i, is given by
minfq(^ pi); ~ q(^ rj)g.
² Supply side
The local loop cost is decomposed into a tra±c sensitive marginal cost, c0 per unit of
volume, and a tra±c insensitive component. The tra±c insensitive part is composed of a
per-consumer connection component f, plus possibly some cost that is joint and common
to all consumers. For notational simplicity, we will ignore the latter (introducing a joint
and common cost would just require an overall upward adjustment of price levels keeping
the price structure as given, if ¯rm viability is an issue). The long distance (trunk)
marginal cost is equal to c1. So, the total marginal cost of a minute of a call involving
two local loops and a long distance tra±c is
c ´ 2c0 + c1:
We let a denote the access charge or termination charge. The marginal cost of an
o®-net call is therefore c +( a ¡ c0) for the caller's network and (c0 ¡ a) for the receiver's
network.
2.2 Ramsey benchmark
For future reference, we derive the social optimum. Consider an idealized situation in
which a benevolent regulator would choose the market shares and the volume of calls. In
our symmetric set-up, equal market division (® = 1
2) minimizes the average consumer's
disutility from not being able to consume his preferred service. The benevolent regulator
would choose the volume of calls so as to maximize
u(q)+~ u(q) ¡ cq:






8To implement the optimal outcome, the benevolent regulator can use symmetric tari®s
so as to implement equal market division (® = 1
2). When the volume is determined by
callers, the optimal volume is obtained by choosing p1 = p2 = p¤; where
p
¤ = c ¡ ~ u
0(q
¤):
The regulator selects the ¯xed fee F (or r) in order to satisfy the industry's break-even
constraint.
When the volume is jointly determined by callers and receivers, the regulator can still
achieve the e±cient outcome by choosing (p = p¤;r = 0). The regulator then uses F
to satisfy the industry break-even constraint. More generally, any fF;rg combination
yielding the same level of F +rq¤ and such that r · ~ u0(q¤) achieves the Ramsey outcome.
3 Regulated or contractually determined reception
charges
This section studies competition in two-part tari®s without discrimination (Fi;p i) (when
the reception charges are exogenously regulated at some levels frigi=1;2). It ¯rst assumes
that callers determine the volume of calls, and then ¯nds su±cient conditions for this to
be the case.
Ignoring the \transportation cost", the net surplus of a network i consumer is
wi = v(pi)+®i~ u(q(pi)) + ®j~ u(q(pj)) ¡ ri[®iq(pi)+®jq(pj)] ¡ Fi: (1)




+ ¾(wi ¡ wj); (2)





+ ¾[v(pi) ¡ v(pj) ¡ (Fi ¡ Fj) ¡ (ri ¡ rj)(®iq(pi)+®jq(pj))]: (3)
Network i's pro¯t is given by
¼i = ®if[pi ¡ c ¡ ®j(a ¡ c0)+®iri]q(pi)+( ri + a ¡ c0)®jq(pj)+Fi ¡ fg:
We will perform our analysis in two steps. First, we will maximize ¼i with respect to
pi given ®i, yielding price p¤¤
i (®i). This will allow us to de¯ne ¦i(®i) ´ ¼i(®i;p ¤¤
i (®i)).
Second, we will maximize ¦i(®i) with respect to ®i.
93.1 Tari® structure: maximization keeping market share con-
stant
We study the program of maximizing ¼i given ®i. Let
~ Fi = Fi + ri(®iq(pi)+®jq(pj)):
Intuitively, Fi + ri(®iq(pi)+®jq(pj)) is a generalized ¯xed fee. Network i's consumers
care only about this sum, not about its composition.
Market shares are determined by the net surplus di®erential :
wi ¡ wj = v(pi) ¡ v(pj) ¡ ~ Fi + ~ Fj: (4)
We have
¼i ´ ®if(pi ¡ c)q(pi) ¡ (a ¡ c0)(1 ¡ ®i)(q(pi) ¡ q(pj)) + ~ Fi ¡ fg:
Using (2) and (4) we have :







After substitution of ~ Fi into the pro¯t function, we have
¼i(pi;® i) ´ ®if(pi ¡ c)q(pi) ¡ (a ¡ c0)(1 ¡ ®i)(q(pi) ¡ q(pj))























= ®i [pi ¡ c ¡ ®j(a ¡ c0)+®irj]
dq
dpi
; for pi > 0;




i (®i)=c + ®j(a ¡ c0) ¡ ®irj: (5)
5In fact, we have, for p¤¤



















< 0; for all pi >p ¤¤
i (®i):
10If rj = 0, the usage price is equal to the average marginal cost faced by network i as
in LRT (1998a). However, in the presence of rj, an increase in q(pi) imposes pecuniary
externalities on network j consumers by making them pay more money for the calls
received from network i. Hence, to maintain market share ®i constant, network i can
charge more money to the consumers of its own network by increasing Fi. In other words,
network j's charging for reception results in a decrease in the marginal cost perceived by
network i. For example, if the access charge is near or above termination cost, charging
receivers is socially desirable since this induces ¯rms to lower emission charges.
If c>r j holds for a¡c0 +rj ¸ 0o ri fc+a¡c0 > 0 holds for a¡c0 +rj < 0, we have
p¤¤
i (®i) > 0. Then, the pro¯t maximizing price pi is uniquely given by p¤¤
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Proposition 1 (strategic marginal cost)
(a) When the volume is determined solely by the caller, only the sum of the monthly
subscriber charge and the subscriber's total reception charge matters given the rival net-
work's competitive o®ering.
(b) In the absence of network-based price discrimination, a network's marginal cost
and emission charge decrease with the other network's reception charge:
p
¤¤
i (®i)=c + ®j(a ¡ c0) ¡ ®irj:
As usual with competition in two-part tari®s, the marginal price is set at the perceived
marginal cost. It is composed of the true marginal cost, c plus a mark up due to the access
charge incurred in o®-net calls (the number of which is proportional to the competitor's
market share ®j), hence ®j(a ¡ c0), minus the pecuniary-e®ect correction ¡®irj.
Socially, and as explained in Section 2, the marginal price should be
c ¡ ~ u
0(q
¤);
which could be obtained by pricing access at its marginal cost a = c0, and by subsidizing




in the absence of reception charges.
In the absence of subsidization, two instruments, the access charge and the reception
charge, can be used to induce the optimal marginal price. Because network i internalizes
11only the positive externality on his own consumers, the reception charge would have to
be (in a symmetric equilibrium) twice the marginal externality if the termination charge
were set equal to termination cost (a = c0). But this would induce receivers to hang
up. The fact that the reception charge cannot exceed the marginal externality calls for an
access charge below the termination cost.
Note that this simple ¯rst-order-condition approach is incomplete because proving the
existence of equilibrium requires some constraints on these instruments (see Section 3.3).
3.2 Tari® level: Maximization with respect to market share
We now maximize ¦i(®i) with respect to ®i. Since we will focus on symmetric equilibria,
we will assume rj = r and study the maximization of ¦i(®i) when network j uses the
optimal pj = c + 1
2(a ¡ c0 ¡ r).
To show the existence of a symmetric equilibrium, let us restrict the analysis to mean-
ingful values of the access charge and of the reception charge such that 1 >a>c 0 ¡ c
and c>r>¡1. Then, we have:
Lemma 1 ¦i(®i) ´ ¼i(p¤¤
i (®i);® i) is well de¯ned and continuous. Furthermore, if ¾ is
small enough or ja ¡ c0 + rj is small enough, it is concave.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
When ¦i(®i) is concave, the unique solution is given by the ¯rst-order condition






+Fj + r(2®iqi +( 1¡ 2®i)qj)=0 : (6)
The case of a small substitutability ¾ is relevant only if the networks are specialized in
the sense of ¯tting geographic or technological niches.6 The condition that the reception
subsidy r not be too remote from the termination discount (c0¡a) underlines the potential
instability that may exist in network competition when reception charges are regulated.
3.3 Symmetric equilibria
For a given reception charge r, equilibria (pi;F i;® i) are characterized by (3), (5) and (6).
The next proposition characterizes symmetric equilibria: (p;F;® = 1
2) for a given value
of r.
Proposition 2 (existence): (a) If ¦i(®i) is concave, a symmetric equilibrium (p;F;® =
1
2) exists.
6It may also be relevant to study the competition between one ¯xed and one mobile networks.
12(b) No cornered-market equilibrium exists.
(c) For any ">0,i fja ¡ c0 + rj >" , no equilibrium exists for ¾ large enough.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
So, if a isn't close to c0 ¡ r and substitutability is high, there exists no pure strategy
equilibrium. Indeed, the only candidate for equilibrium is subject to undercutting by one
network.7







(a ¡ c0); (7)
and (6),
F = f +
1
2¾
¡ (p + r ¡ c)q(p): (8)




; when (F;p) satisfy (7) and (8).
Thus, the pro¯t is always equal to the Hotelling pro¯t with unit demand, as in LRT
(1998a). Provided that symmetric equilibria exist, the access charge and the reception
charge have no impact on pro¯t.
Summarizing we have:
Proposition 3 (characterization): The symmetric equilibrium is characterized by:
(a) p + r
2 = c + 1
2(a ¡ c0);F = f + 1
2¾ ¡ (p + r ¡ c)q(p):
(b) Each ¯rm's pro¯t is equal to 1
4¾.
3.4 Social welfare maximizing equilibrium
What matters for social welfare is p only. From (7), p is equal to p¤, if and only if
r = a ¡ c0 +2 ( c ¡ p
¤): (9)
We have the following proposition.
Proposition 4 (e±ciency): Suppose that ~ u(q)=¯u(q) holds with ¯ ¸ 0. If the access
charge a satis¯es ¡c<a¡ c0 <
1¡¯
1+¯c for ¾ small enough or a ¡ c0 + r ¼ 0 for ¾ large
enough, the social welfare maximizing price p¤ can be implemented as an equilibrium of
network competition by choosing r =( a ¡ c0)+
2¯
1+¯c.
7The logic is here similar to that in LRT (1998a).
13Proof. When ~ u(q)=¯u(q), e±ciency requires a¡c0 = r¡
2¯
1+¯c.F o r¾ small enough, this
condition, together with a¡c0+c>0 and c>r , gives ¡c<a¡c0 <
1¡¯
1+¯c. The existence
comes from Proposition 2. For ¾ large enough, if a ¡ c0 + r ¼ 0, we have p¤¤
i (®i) > 0 for
all ®i.
3.5 Receiver sovereignty
The above analysis has not taken into account the fact that receivers may want to hang
up. However, the above existence and optimality results are readily extended to the
case of receiver sovereignty as long as the regulated reception charge does not exceed the
marginal utility of reception; r · ~ u0(q(p)).
Proposition 5 : A symmetric equilibrium (pe;Fe;® =1 =2) in the absence of receiver
sovereignty (where pe and F e are given in Proposition 3) is still an equilibrium under
receiver sovereignty as long as
r · ~ u
0(q(p
e)):
Proof. Consider an equilibrium in the absence of receiver sovereignty. In particular, for
each network i, pe maximizes pro¯t (given market share) over the domain P = fpi : r ·
~ u0(q(pi))g. Because under receiver sovereignty network i's pro¯t becomes insensitive to pi
for pi such that r>~ u0(q(pi)) (since demand is then determined by r), pe still maximizes
pro¯t in the extended domain P 0 = fpi : pi ¸ 0g.
Let us summarize the main result of the section.
For low network substitutability, existence is always guaranteed. For any termination
charge a, there exists a value of the reception charge (given by (9)) which induces the
optimal marginal calling charge p¤ = c¡ ~ u0(q¤). Guaranteeing that receivers do not want
to hang up sets an upper bound on the termination charge which equals c0 ¡
¯
1+¯c when
~ u(q)=¯u(q), such that the termination charge must be below the termination cost.
For the more interesting case of high network substitutability, again there is for each
termination charge a value of the reception charge that yields e±ciency, but the existence
of equilibrium calls for a ¼ c0 ¡ r. In the limit of perfect network substitutability, and
for ~ u(q)=¯u(q), these two equations impose r =
¯c
1+¯ and a = c0 ¡
¯c
1+¯. For this value
of r, the caller and the receiver hang up together. A single value of the access charge is
compatible with e±ciency; it is smaller than the termination cost.
Altogether, these results allow us to conclude that a proper regulation of the reception
charge enables the regulator to achieve the internalization of call externalities.
4 Market determined reception charges
As we discussed in the introduction, the absence of uncertainty about marginal utilities
make operators locally indi®erent as to the level of their reception charge in the range
14of parameters in which the caller's net marginal utility strictly exceeds the receiver's net
marginal utility. This both is unrealistic and complicates the analysis. In reality, the
receiver's utility, for example, may be subject to noise: for example, one is less eager
to stay long on the phone when a visitor is in one's o±ce or when watching over young
children. When reception charges are market determined, it turns out to be convenient to
allow for such state-contingent marginal utilities, since then both the calling and reception
charges have incentive e®ects.
Suppose that the marginal utility that a receiver derives from receiving a call is subject
to a noise ².8 The receiver's utility is:
e u(q)+²q:
We assume that ² follows the distribution function F(¢), with wide enough support [²;²],
zero mean and density f(¢), which is strictly positive for all ² in [²;²]; and that the noise
² is identically and independently distributed for each caller-receiver pair.
For simplicity, we further assume in this section that:
e u(q)=¯u(q) with ¯>0.
We ¯rst study how the volume is determined given (pi;r j) and a realized value ² of the
random variable. Unless the caller interrupts the conversation ¯rst, the receiver with noise
² will equate his marginal utility e u0 + ² to the reception charge rj. Hence, the volume of
call is given by q(max(pi;
rj¡²
¯ )). Therefore, the volume of calls from network i to network
j is given by:
®i®jD(pi;r j);







Similarly, the utility that a network i consumer derives by making calls to network j
consumers is given by:
®jU(pi;r j);







The utility that a network j consumer derives from receiving calls from network i con-
sumers is given by:
®ie U(pi;r j);
8The caller's marginal utility could also be subject to a noise without any change in the results. The
important feature of the following analysis is that both the caller and the receiver have positive probability
of hanging up ¯rst.
15with e U(pi:rj) ´
Z ²
rj¡¯pi













Therefore, the net surplus of a network i consumer is given by:
wi = ®iU(pi;r i)+®jU(pi;r j)+®ie U(pi;r i)+®j e U(pj;r i)
¡pi [®iD(pi;r i)+®jD(pi;r j)] ¡ ri [®iD(pi;r i)+®jD(pj;r i)] ¡ Fi:
And the pro¯t of network i is given by:
¼i ´ ®i f®i(pi ¡ c)D(pi;r i)+®j [pi ¡ c ¡ (a ¡ c0)]D(pi;r j)
+®j(a ¡ c0)D(pj;r i)+ri [®iD(pi;r i)+®jD(pj;r i)] + Fi ¡ fg:
We now analyze the ¯rst-order conditions. Given market share ®i, the ¯rst-order
derivative of ¼i with respect to pi is given by:
®i [1 ¡ F(ri ¡ ¯pi)]®i [u
0 + e u
0 + E(² j ² ¸ ri ¡ ¯pi) ¡ c]q
0
+®i [1 ¡ F(rj ¡ ¯pi)][®j(u
0 ¡ c ¡ a + c0)+®i (rj ¡ e u
0 ¡ E(² j ² ¸ rj ¡ ¯pi))]q
0:
Consider a small decrease in pi. This increases the volume of on-net calls by
[1 ¡ F(ri ¡ ¯pi)]q0 and the volume of o®-net calls by [1 ¡ F(rj ¡ ¯pi)]q0. In the market
for on-net calls, network i consumers' utility increases by u0 + e u0 + E(² j¢ ), which the
network can extract by increasing the ¯xed tari® Fi. In the market for o®-net calls,
network i consumers' utility increases by u0 and network j consumers' utility increases by
e u0 + E(² j¢ ) ¡ rj. As before, e u0 + E(² j¢ ) represents the direct externalities, rj represents
the pecuniary externalities and an increase in network j consumers' utility requires a
decrease in Fi in order to keep ®i constant.9
When r = ri = rj, the ¯rst-order derivative simpli¯es to:
®i [1 ¡ F(r ¡ ¯pi)][pi ¡ c ¡ ®j(a ¡ c0)+®ir]q
0;
which gives the following ¯rst-order condition:
pi = c + ®j(a ¡ c0) ¡ ®ir:
We note that this condition is the one we found in Section 3 in the absence of noise.
The ¯rst-order derivative of ¼i with respect to ri is given by:
®iF(ri ¡ ¯pi)®iE [(u
0 + e u
0 + ² ¡ c)q
0 j ² · ri ¡ ¯pi]
1
¯
9The reader will check that the strategic-marginal-cost pricing formula of Proposition 1 holds as the
noise vanishes and the caller determines volume with probability (close to) one.
16+®iF(ri ¡ ¯pj)E [®j(e u
0 + ² + a ¡ c0)q
0 + ®i(pj ¡ u
0)q




Consider a small decrease in ri. This will increase the volume of on-net calls by
F(ri ¡ ¯pi) E(q0 j¢ )=¯ and the volume of the o®-net calls received from network j
by F(ri ¡ ¯pj)E(q0 j¢ )/¯. In the market for on-net calls, network i consumers' utility
increases by E(u0 +e u0 +² j¢ ). In the market for o®-net calls, network i consumers' utility
increases by E(e u0 + ² j¢ ) and network j consumers' utility increases by E(u0 ¡ pj j¢ ). u0
represents the direct externalities and pj represents the pecuniary externalities.
When p = pi = pj, the ¯rst-order derivative simpli¯es to:
®iF(ri ¡ ¯p)E [(ri ¡ ®ic + ®j(a ¡ c0)+®ip)q




which gives the following ¯rst-order condition:
ri = ®ic ¡ ®j(a ¡ c0) ¡ ®ip
We note that this condition is the one we would ¯nd in the absence of noise if the volume
were determined by receivers.
Consider now a symmetric equilibrium with ®i = 1
2. From the two ¯rst-order condi-
tions, we have:
p = c +




c ¡ (a ¡ c0) ¡ p
2
:
These two conditions yield p = c +( a ¡ c0) and r = c0 ¡ a. Furthermore, we show
below that, as the noise vanishes (the distribution F converges to a spike at value 0 while
keeping a wide enough support to confer an incentive role upon the reception charges),
the equilibrium in which the volume is determined by callers exists if the access charge
markup is larger than ¡
¯
1+¯c. This analysis is summarized in:
Proposition 6 (o®-net-cost pricing) Suppose that the reception charges are non-
cooperatively set by the networks and that the marginal utility of call reception is random.
(a) There exists a unique symmetric candidate equilibrium. For this candidate, the
reception charge is equal to the access charge discount:
r = c0 ¡ a:
And the emission charge is
p = c +( a ¡ c0):
That is, the networks price calls and call receptions at their o®-net cost.
17(b) Furthermore, when a ¡ c0 ¸¡
¯
1+¯c holds, as the noise converges to zero, the
candidate equilibrium is an equilibrium and in the equilibrium the volume is determined
by callers.
(c) As the noise converges to zero, the optimum can be approximated by choosing an
access charge a such that a ¡ c0 = ¡r¤ ´¡ ¯c=(1 + ¯).
Proof: See Appendix 3.
Note the remarkable property that the privately optimal reception charge (equal to
the o®-net reception cost) ensures the existence of equilibrium for any value of the access
charge. Furthermore, a proper choice of the access charge yields e±ciency.
However, e±ciency is of course impossible to achieve with a single instrument in
the presence of noise. For example, in the caller-determined-volume region (u0(q)=p
and ~ u0(q)+²>r ), the sum of the marginal utilities always exceeds c: There is always
underprovision of communications.
5 Network-based discrimination
Network i's tari® is characterized now by a ¯ve-uple fFi;p i; b pi;r i;b rig, where hats refer
to o®-net communications. Again, we can distinguish the case in which the reception
charges (ri; ^ ri) are regulated from the case in which they are not.
We show below that network-based discrimination is a mixed blessing. While network-
based discrimination induces network i to choose the on-net price pi to fully internalize the
externalities on its receivers, it also allows networks to implement selective connectivity
breakdown by charging very high or even in¯nite prices (b pi or b ri) for o®-net calls, which
results in a global lack of connectivity.
For simplicity, we will assume again in this section that e u(q)=¯u(q) with ¯ ¸ 0:
We identify two di®erent reasons why network competition results in connectivity
breakdown:
² In the absence of reception charges, each network's equilibrium o®-net caller charge
tends to in¯nity as the receiver's utility converges toward the caller's (that is, ¯
converges to 1). The intuition for this result is that a receiver on the rival network
(who, recall, does not pay any reception charge) fully enjoys her surplus from the
call. In contrast, the caller-network pair perceives only the net surplus (caller surplus
minus calling cost). And so, o®-net calls make the rival network relatively more
attractive for ¯ large, which leads to a connectivity breakdown.
² The introduction of reception charges should a priori reduce this incentive for con-
nectivity breakdown. Reception charges, however, provide a second instrument for
implementing selective connectivity breakdown: Instead of inducing the caller to
hang up (or not to call o®-net) as above, each network can induce the receiver to
hang up o®-net calls. We provide su±cient conditions for the equilibrium o®-net
18emission or reception charges to be in¯nite. This suggests looking at the regulation
of the reception charge for o®-net calls b ri. Hence, we study network competition un-
der the regulation of o®-net reception charges and show that the e±cient allocation
can be achieved with an appropriate regulation of b ri.
5.1 Connectivity breakdown in the absence of reception charge
We show that, in the absence of reception charge, the equilibrium price for o®-net calls
b p goes to in¯nity as ¯ goes to one. Thus, we have a de facto connectivity breakdown.
Furthermore, for ¯ ¸ 1, we show that network competition always results in connectivity
breakdown (b p = 1).
In the absence of reception charge, the volume is automatically determined by callers.
The net surplus of a network i consumer is given by:
wi = ®iv(pi)+®jv(b pi)+®ie u(q(pi)) + ®je u(q(b pj)) ¡ Fi: (10)









+ ¾ [®iv(pi)+®jv(b pi) ¡ ®jv(pj) ¡ ®iv(b pj)
+®ie u(q(pi)) + ®je u(q(b pj)) ¡ ®je u(q(pj)) ¡ ®ie u(q(b pi)) ¡ Fi + Fj]:
Network i's pro¯t is given by
¼i = ®i f(pi ¡ c)®iq(pi)+(b pi ¡ c ¡ (a ¡ c0))®jq(b pi)
+(a ¡ c0)®jq(b pj)+Fi ¡ fg:
As in the no-discrimination case, we will perform our analysis in two steps. First, we
maximize ¼i with respect to pi and b pi keeping market share ®i constant. Second, we
perform the maximization with respect to the market share.





¤ = c ¡ e u
0(q(p
¤)): (11)
For on-net calls, network i fully internalizes the externalities on receivers. Since network
i is a monopoly in the market for on-net calls, under a two-part tari®, it maximizes the
pie. Hence, both networks choose the same price p¤ regardless of the market shares.
19The ¯rst-order derivative of pro¯t with respect to b pi is given by:




; for b pi > 0:
The ¯rst term represents the direct impact on the pro¯t while the second term rep-
resents the indirect impact arising from the condition of keeping market share constant.
The latter represents the direct externalities on the consumers of network j. Consider an
incremental increase in the volume of calls from network i to network j, q(b pi) ´ b qi. Then,
network j's consumers' utility from reception increases by e u0(q(b pi)). When the market
share ®i is kept constant, an increase in the utility obtained by network j's consumers
implies an increase in the marginal cost perceived by network i. Since e u0(q(b pi)) = ¯b pi,
the optimal price b p¤¤






1¡(1+¯)®i if ®i < 1
1+¯;
1; otherwise,
where we assume that c + a ¡ c0 > 0.
Therefore, social and network i's private incentives regarding the choice of b pi are in
con°ict. From the social welfare point of view, the positive externalities on the consumers
of network j should be internalized by a decrease in b pi. In contrast, from network i's
point of view, these externalities are costly in that it must increase the utility of its own
consumers in order to make the marginal consumer indi®erent between two networks. This
results in an increase in its perceived marginal cost and, as a consequence, an increase in
b pi. The con°ict becomes larger as ¯ increases or ®i increases. This is because the utility
that consumers of network j derive from receiving calls originating in network i becomes
larger as ¯ increases or ®i increases. To illustrate the point, consider the case a = c0 with
®i < 1
1+¯.I f¯ = 0, there is no con°ict between social and private incentives and the price
is optimal: b p¤¤
i (®i)=p¤ = c. However, as ¯ increases, b pi increases. Furthermore, for any
¯>0, if ®i > 1
1+¯, b p¤¤





¯(c + a ¡ c0)
[1 ¡ (1 + ¯)®i]




Remark: The fact that network i takes into account the direct externalities on network j
consumers when it chooses the price for o®-net calls o®ers a new explanation of why the
price of calling mobile phones from ¯xed networks is high. Doyle and Smith (1998), who
do not consider the possibility that consumers can obtain utility from reception argue
that there exists no competitive force that can drive mobile companies to charge low
termination prices for o®-net calls from ¯xed networks and that the resulting exorbitant
termination charges substantially in°ate the price of calling mobile phones from ¯xed
networks.10 Our model o®ers an alternative explanation for this phenomenon based on
the incentive of ¯xed networks to choose high o®-net call prices. Usually, the ¯xed-phone
service is o®ered by a dominant ¯rm with large market share compared to those of mobile
10Doyle and Smith (1998)'s proposal of RPP does not really work in their model because receivers
would hang up.
20companies. Therefore, the direct externalities on the consumers of mobile networks are
large, which induces the ¯xed network to charge a high price for calling mobile phones.
Furthermore, contrary to Doyle and Smith's argument, when consumers derive utility
from reception, there exist competitive pressures which may induce mobile companies to
choose moderate termination charges.
Proposition 7 : In the absence of reception charge, and if a symmetric equilibrium with
network-based price discrimination exists:
(a) The price for on-net calls is socially optimal: p = p¤.
(b) (connectivity breakdown) (i) For 0 · ¯<1,a s¯ tends to one, network
competition results in a de facto connectivity breakdown in that the price for o®-net calls
goes to in¯nity:
b p =
c + a ¡ c0
1 ¡ ¯
:
(ii) For ¯ ¸ 1, any symmetric equilibrium exhibits connectivity breakdown: b p = 1.
Appendix 4 studies the existence of equilibrium for a constant-elasticity demand func-
tion. The second-order derivative for the program of maximizing the pro¯t ¦i with respect
to ®i is negative if ¾ is small enough and a ' c0. These are su±cient conditions for a
symmetric equilibrium to exist.
5.2 Connectivity breakdown with reception charge
In this section, we examine how the introduction of reception charges a®ects connectivity.
In this case the volume is determined by both callers and receivers.
Let qij = minfq(b pi); e q(b rj)g for i 6= j and qii = minfq(pi); e q(ri)g.
We have
wi = ®iu(qii)+®ju(qij)+®ie u(qii)) + ®je u(qji)
¡[pi®iqii + b pi®jqij] ¡ [ri®iqii + b ri®jqji] ¡ Fi:
Network i's pro¯t is given by
¼i = ®i [(pi ¡ c + ri)®iqii +(b pi ¡ c ¡ (a ¡ c0))®jqij
+(b ri + a ¡ c0)®jqji + Fi ¡ f]:
As in the absence of reception charge, it is optimal for network i to maximize the pie
in the market for on-net calls. Therefore, we have:
(pi = p
¤;r i · r
¤)o r( pi · p
¤;r i = r
¤):
21Once the volume is determined by p¤ (respectively, r¤), ri (respectively, pi) does not a®ect
the pro¯t as long as ri · r¤ (respectively, pi · p¤).
Consider the o®-net calls from network i to network j. The volume of calls qij is deter-
mined by max(b pi;
b rj
¯ ). For expositional convenience, we introduce the following notation:
¼
b p
i(b pi : ®i;b rj) ´ ®i f®j [u(qij) ¡ (c + a ¡ c0)qij]+®i [b rjqij ¡ e u(qij)]g;
¼
b r
j(b rj : ®i; b pi) ´ ®j f®i [e u(qij)+( a ¡ c0)qij]+®j [b piqij ¡ u(qij)]g:
¼
b p
i(b pi) (respectively, ¼b r
j(b rj)) represents the share of ¼i (respectively, ¼j) that can be a®ected




0. Therefore, each network can have at least zero pro¯t in the market for o®-net calls
from network i to j by implementing selective connectivity breakdown. This de¯nes an
\individual rationality constraint". Since, in the absence of reception charge, ¼b r
j < 0
is possible at equilibrium, the introduction of reception charges adds a new individual
rationality constraint: ¼b r
i ¸ 0.
When ¯b pi ¸ b rj, the ¯rst-order derivative of ¼
b p
i with respect to b pi is given by:




; for b pi > 0:
As it was the case in the absence of reception charge, the ¯rst term represents the direct
impact on the pro¯t while the second term represents the indirect impact which arises
from the condition of keeping the market share constant. The second term has two
components: pecuniary externalities and direct externalities on the consumers of network
j. The pecuniary externalities occur since the consumers of network j have to pay for
reception. The optimal price b pi depends upon the market share in a complex way and can
be in¯nite for a certain range of market shares. When ¯b pi < b rj, the ¯rst-order derivative
with respect to b pi is zero.
When b rj ¸ ¯b pi, the ¯rst-order derivative of ¼b r
j with respect to b rj is given by:
®j
½
®i [b rj + a ¡ c0]+®j
·








; for b rj > 0:
The interpretation is similar to the one given for the ¯rst-order derivative with respect
to b pi: the ¯rst term represents the direct impact on the pro¯t while the second term
represents the indirect impact, which is composed of pecuniary externalities and direct
externalities. The direct externalities represent the utilities that consumers of network i
derive from making calls to consumers of network j.
The following proposition focuses on symmetric equilibria. We ignore equilibria based
on \weakly dominated strategies" (an equilibrium with total connectivity breakdown al-
ways exists since b pi = 1 is a best response to b rj = 1 and vice versa).
Proposition 8 (a) (connectivity breakdown): (i) For ¯ small enough and a<c 0,
any symmetric equilibrium exhibits connectivity breakdown: b r = 1:
22(ii) For ¯ large enough and c + a ¡ c0 > 0, any symmetric equilibrium exhibits con-
nectivity breakdown: b p = 1.
(b) (ine±ciency): No e±cient symmetric equilibrium exists for ¯ 6=1 .
Proof See Appendix 5.
Reception charges are a mixed blessing in the context of network-based price discrim-
ination. On the one hand, a positive b rj, through the pecuniary externalities, reduces
the marginal cost perceived by network i, which helps network i to internalize the ex-
ternalities on receivers. On the other hand, b rj is set strategically by network j, whose
private incentive is in con°ict with social welfare maximization: the gain that consumers
of network i derive from placing calls to consumers of network j increases the marginal
cost perceived by network j.
Connectivity breakdowns occur for ¯ small enough if the access charge markup is
negative (a ¡ c0 < 0). When ¯ is small, callers on network i derive some utility from
interconnection of the two networks while receivers of network j derive almost no utility
from interconnection. This makes network j's pro¯t associated with b rj (¼b r
j(b rj)) negative
whenever the access revenue from interconnection is negative and, consequently, network
j is better o® setting b rj = 1 when b pi < 1. Since, in the absence of reception charge,
connectivity breakdown is not an issue for ¯ small, this result shows that reception charges
can make it even harder to internalize call externalities. By symmetry, when ¯ is large
enough, receivers on network j derive a large utility from interconnection while callers on
network i derive a relatively small utility. Hence, network i is better o® setting b pi = 1
when b rj < 1. Finally, there exists no e±cient symmetric equilibrium. In Appendix 5, we
show that e±ciency requires b p = p¤, b r = r¤, and a ¡ c0 + r¤ = 0. However, in this case,
¼b r
j is strictly negative for ¯ smaller than one and ¼
b p
i is strictly negative for ¯ larger than
one. Therefore, one of the two networks has the incentive to break down connectivity.
5.3 Regulation of reception charges
We just saw that network-based price discrimination allows each network to implement
selective connectivity breakdown, that is breakdown of connectivity in one direction. This
selective connectivity breakdown results in a two-way lack of connectivity. This obser-
vation calls for some form of regulation (broadly de¯ned), in the same way termination
charges cannot just be left to the discretion of the terminating networks. This \regulation"
can take the form of a cooperatively determined o®-net reception charge. Alternatively,
the o®-net reception charge may be set by a regulatory agency. In this section, we consider
a speci¯c form of regulation. Namely, we will assume that the regulator sets b rj such that
b rj =
½
g(p); if b pi <p ;
g(b pi); if b pi ¸ p;
with g(b pi) ´ ¯
´
´ ¡ 1
b pi ¡ "b p
´
i and 0 <p<c+ a ¡ c0;
23where ´ is the elasticity of demand, which we will assume is constant, and " is a positive
constant such that g(p)=¯p and g(b pi) · ¯b pi for all b pi ¸ p: Hence, b rj is chosen indirectly
by network i.
The regulation of b ri has two main consequences. First, since network i cannot control
b ri, the regulation eliminates its strategic behavior regarding the choice of b ri. In particular,
network i's opportunity pro¯t related to o®-net calls from network j to network i can be
negative (network i would prefer to set ^ ri = 1 if it could). Second, the regulation is
designed so as to ensure that a change in network i 's o®-net caller charge (b pi)d o e sn o t
impact the welfare of a receiver on network j. This is why we focus on this form of
regulation. It may look peculiar but it obeys some logic. A change in b pi induces a change
dq=db pi in the volume of o®-net calls of network i's customers for all b pi ¸ p. The total
externality on a network j receiver is
d
db pi
[e u(q(b pi)) ¡ b rj(b pi)q(b pi) ]=0 ;
if b ri is set as above. We note that when b pi <p , both b rj and qij are independent of b pi.
We continue to assume joint volume determination. As earlier, we will perform our
analysis in two steps. First, we will maximize ¼i given ®i. This will allow us to de¯ne
¦i(®i) ´ ¼i(®i;p ¤
i(®i); b p¤
i(®i)). Second, we will maximize ¦i(®i) with respect to ®i.
5.3.1 Tari® structure: Maximization keeping market share constant
Since the regulation of b rj has no impact on the choice of pi and ri, we have as before:
(pi = p
¤;r i · r
¤)o r( pi · p
¤;r i = r
¤): (12)
The ¯rst-order derivative of pro¯t with respect to b pi is given by:
®i
½













; for b pi > 0:
Under the rule chosen for the regulation of b rj, the second terms disappears and the




¤ = c +( a ¡ c0): (13)
The o®-net price is equal to the o®-net marginal cost as in LRT (1998b). Both networks
choose the same price b p¤ regardless of market shares.
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245.3.2 Tari® level: Maximization with respect to market share
We now study the program of maximizing ¦i(®i) with respect to ®i.
Lemma 2 ¦i(®i) ´ ¼i(p¤
i; b p¤
i;®i) is well de¯ned and continuous. Suppose c+(a¡c0) > 0.
Then, if ¾ is small enough or if ja ¡ c0 + rj is small enough and r ¸ b r(b p¤
i), it is concave.
Proof See Appendix 6.





¤ ¡ c)®jq(b p







¤)+( ®i ¡ ®j)[v(p
¤) ¡ v(b p
¤)+e u(q(p







¤) ¡ (b p





¤) ¡ v(b p
¤)+e u(p








We already know that both networks choose the same pair of prices pi; b pi regardless of
market shares. Equilibria (p¤; b p¤;r i;F i;® i) are characterized by (2), (12), (13) and (14).
Since ri does not a®ect ¼i as long as ri · r¤, there are multiple equilibria.
Here, we are interested in symmetric equilibria: p¤; b p¤;r;F;® = 1
2. When ¦i(®i)i s
concave, there exist symmetric equilibria:
Proposition 9 (existence): Suppose that c +( a ¡ c0) > 0 holds and that ¦i(®i) is
concave. Then multiple symmetric equilibria (p¤; b p¤;r;F) exist.
Proof Under the condition, (2), (12), (13) and (14) are satis¯ed for ®i = 1
2:
We note that ri is indeterminate since it has no strategic impact on pj or b pj.
In a symmetric equilibrium, we have from (14),





¤) ¡ b r(b p
¤)q(b p
¤) ¡ [v(p
¤) ¡ v(b p
¤)+e u(q(p
¤)) ¡ e u(q(b p
¤))]: (15)
In the case of no-discrimination, the ¯xed tari® is given by F = f+ 1
2¾ ¡(p¡c+r)q(p):

















¡ (v ¡ b v + e u ¡ b e u)
¸
:
Thus, the pro¯t can di®er from 1
4¾. In particular, the pro¯t is increasing in r as long as
customers remain connected.
What matters for social welfare is p; b p;®. Since p = p¤;® = 1
2; we need to have
b p = p¤ to maximize social welfare. This can be achieved provided the access price satis¯es
a ¡ c0 = p¤ ¡ c = ¡r¤. We noted that in the no-discrimination case as well the access
price had to be equal to c0 ¡ r¤ in the e±cient equilibrium.
Suppose now that the ¯rms negotiate the access price a. Then, we can show that there
exists an equilibrium where the ¯rms maximize social welfare and make the monopoly
pro¯t under the constraint of serving all consumers.








[r ¡ b r]q
¤:
Hence, the pro¯t is increasing in the di®erence between r and b r.
Consider r given by












Then, the sum of the pro¯ts is given by,
X
i=1;2
¼i = v0 + u(q
¤)+e u(q
¤) ¡ cq




which is the monopoly pro¯t.
The idea is quite simple. The ¯rms maximize the pie by choosing the social welfare
maximizing price and use r to satisfy the individual rationality constraint of the consumer
located at the middle point.11
We have the following proposition:
Proposition 10 (characterization): (a). The symmetric equilibria are characterized
by:
(i) p = p¤; b p = c +( a ¡ c0):
(ii) Each ¯rm's pro¯t is increasing in r.
(b) If the access price is given by a¡c0+r¤ =0 , the symmetric equilibrium maximizes
the social welfare.
(c) There exists an equilibrium in which the ¯rms maximize social welfare and obtain
the monopoly pro¯t.
11So, we assume implicitely that the ¯rms serve the whole market.
26Proof. See Appendix 7.
The above proposition shows that the access charge plays a crucial role in determining
social welfare. Regardless of whether there is network-based discrimination or not, and
regardless of whether there exists regulation of reception charges or not, the optimal
outcome requires a ¡ c0 + r¤ =0 .
We give below the intuition for the result that the pro¯t is increasing in the di®erence
between r and b r in the e±cient equilibrium. Consider network i's deviation in terms
of ®i (equivalently, in terms of F) from a symmetric equilibrium with p = b p = p¤ and
¯p¤ ¸ r>b r. Precisely, suppose that ®i increases by ¢®i > 0 after the deviation.
Although this deviation does not change the total volume of calls placed or received by
a consumer, it a®ects the composition of the volume between on-net and o®-net calls.
In particular, after the deviation, a network i consumer receives more on-net calls than
o®-net calls while a network j consumer receives more o®-net calls than on net-calls. This
implies that, when r>b r holds, after the deviation, a network i consumer will pay more
reception charge while a network j consumer will pay less. Since stealing a fraction of
consumers from the other network makes the consumers of its own network unhappier
and the remaining consumers of the other network happier in terms of reception charge,
competition becomes less intense when r ¡ b r is larger, which results in a higher ¯xed fee
F and a higher equilibrium pro¯t.
6 Conclusion
We provided a comprehensive overview of the main insights in the introduction, and so
there is no need to reproduce it fully here. Su±ces it to reiterate the key lines of the
analysis:
² From a normative viewpoint, when receivers value receiving calls, calling charges
must lie below the communications' marginal cost. This \calling subsidy" in prin-
ciple could be obtained by setting the termination charge below the marginal cost
of termination.
² By lowering each network's \strategic marginal cost", reception charges also con-
tribute to an internalization of the externality on receivers. The termination charge
and the reception charge can be regulated in such a way that a symmetric equilib-
rium exists and is e±cient.
² When both emission and reception demands are elastic and reception charges are
market determined, it is optimal for each operator to equate the prices for emis-
sion and reception with their o®-net costs. Consequently, the equilibrium reception
charges decrease with the termination charge, which reinforces the encouragement
provided by termination discounts to set low caller charges. For an appropriately
chosen termination charge, the symmetric equilibrium is again e±cient.
² Last, network-based price discrimination creates strong incentives for connectivity
breakdowns, even among equal networks.
27Because the issues studied here are central to the development of network industries
exhibiting externalities between the various sides of the market, we hope that this paper
will stimulate further research extending the analysis in several important directions,
including competition among an arbitrary number of networks, asymmetric networks
(installed bases, cost structures,...), and alternative descriptions of call externalities.
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30Appendix 1
That ¦i(®i) is continuous is obvious. Let us show that it is concave. The ¯rst-order






















+Fj + r(2®iqi +( 1¡ 2®i)qj):






+( a ¡ c0 + r)f2[qi(p
¤¤





The existence is trivial if a ¡ c0 + r =0 .
We study below the case a ¡ c0 + r 6= 0, given a<1, r>¡1.
If a ¡ c0 + r>0, let us write
p
¤¤
i (®i)=c ¡ r + ®j(a ¡ c0 + r) ¸ c ¡ r:
Therefore, p¤¤
i (®i) is bounded below uniformly in ®i by a positive number.
If a ¡ c0 + r<0, let us write
p
¤¤
i (®i)=c + a ¡ c0 ¡ ®i(a ¡ c0 + r) ¸ c + a ¡ c0:
Therefore, p¤¤
i (®i) is bounded below uniformly in ®i by a positive number.
Since p¤¤
i (®i) is also bounded above uniformly in ®i, the continuous functions qi(pi)
and q0
i(pi) are also bounded uniformly.
Therefore, f(®i;p ¤¤
i (®i)) is negative uniformly in ®i if either ¾ is small enough or
ja ¡ c0 + rj is small enough.
Appendix 2
(a) The candidate symmetric equilibria satisfy (3), (5) and (6) with ®i = 1
2. Substitut-
ing the ¯rst-order condition in ®i and pi in the objective function of the ¯rm, the pro¯t
is independent of r.
31(b) Suppose that network 1, say, corners the market. We have ¼1 = F1 ¡ f +( p1 +
r ¡ c)q(p1) ¸ 0 and ¼2 = 0. But network 2 can charge p2 = p1, and F2 = F1 + " and
attract a share 1
2 ¡ "¾ of the market which is strictly positive for " small enough. Its
pro¯t e ¼2 =( 1
2 ¡ "¾)(¼1 + ") is then strictly positive for " small enough.


























Since ja ¡ c0 + rj >"and prices are bounded above and below, (a¡c0+r)2 min[¡q0
1;¡q0
2]
is bounded below by a strictly positive number. Therefore, for ¾ large enough, at least one






2 , is strictly positive. Hence, no equilibrium
exists.
Appendix 3
We show that a symmetric equilibrium exists in the absence of noise. By continuity,
the candidate symmetric equilibrium is an equilibrium for a small enough noise.
Let (p¤¤;r ¤¤) denote a symmetric equilibrium under joint determination in the absence












Proof. Consider the case in which the volume is determined by callers: ¯p¤¤ ¸ r¤¤.W e
study one-dimensional deviations. Since the ¯rst-order derivative of ¼i with respect to pi
for pi ¸ p¤¤ (keeping market share ®i equal to 1
2) must not be strictly positive at pi = p¤¤,
we have
p







Since the ¯rst-order derivative of ¼i with respect to ri for ri ¸ ¯p¤¤ (keeping market share
®i equal to 1










12We note that the ¯rst-order derivative of ¼i with respect to ri is zero for ri <¯ p ¤¤.





















When the volume is determined by receivers (¯p¤¤ <r ¤¤), after applying a similar logic,
we obtain that r¤¤
¯ ¸ p¤ holds.
We now show the existence of the following equilibrium focusing on the caller-determined
volume case: p¤¤ = c+ 1
2(a¡c0 ¡r¤¤), r¤¤ = c0 ¡a: In the equilibrium candidate, the call









Lemma 4 If a¡c0 ¸¡
¯c
1+¯ holds, there exists a symmetric equilibrium (p¤¤;r ¤¤) satisfying
p¤¤ = c + 1
2(a ¡ c0 ¡ r¤¤) ¸ r¤¤
¯ and r¤¤ = c0 ¡ a:
Proof. Since the equilibrium candidate satis¯es p¤¤ +r¤¤ = c, p¤¤ ¸ r¤¤
¯ implies p¤¤ ¸ p¤,
r¤¤ · r¤. We ¯rst examine one-dimensional deviations and then joint deviations.
One-dimensional deviations
Consider network i's deviation in terms of pi for ¯pi ¸ r¤¤ (keeping ®i and ri = r¤¤
constant). The ¯rst-order derivative is given by









¤¤ = c ¡ r
¤¤ for all ®i 2 [0;1]:
Consider now network i's deviation in terms of ri for ri ¸ ¯p¤¤ (keeping ®i and pi = p¤¤
constant). The ¯rst-order derivative is given by





which is negative since we have
ri +( 1¡ ®i)(a ¡ c0)+®i(p
¤¤ ¡ c)=ri +( 1¡ ®i)(a ¡ c0) ¡ ®ir
¤¤
= ri ¡ r
¤¤ ¸ 0:
33Hence, the above deviation is not pro¯table for all ®i.
Joint deviations
We now study joint deviations. We will perform our analysis in three steps. First,
given pi, we study the best choice of ri keeping market share ®i constant. Second, we
study the joint deviation in terms of (pi;r i) keeping market share constant. Last, we
study the deviation in terms of market share.
Step 1. Choice of ri given (pi;® i)
Case 1: pi · r¤¤
¯
If ri · ¯pi, ri does not a®ect ¼i.
If ¯pi · ri · ¯p¤¤, ri a®ects only the volume of on-net calls. Then, ri = r¤ is optimal.
If ¯p¤¤ · ri, ri a®ects both the volume of on-net calls and that of o®-net calls from
network j. We know, from the ¯rst-order condition (18), that ri = ¯p¤¤ is optimal.
Therefore, when pi · r¤¤
¯ , ri = r¤ is optimal.
Case 2: r¤¤
¯ <p i · p¤¤
If ri · ¯pi, ri does not a®ect ¼i.
If ¯pi · ri · ¯p¤¤, ri a®ects only the volume of on-net calls. Then, ri = max[¯pi;r ¤]
is optimal.
If ¯p¤¤ · ri, ri a®ects both the volume of on-net calls and that of o®-net calls from
network j. We know, from the ¯rst-order condition (18), that ri = ¯p¤¤ is optimal.
Therefore, when r¤¤
¯ · pi · p¤¤, ri = r¤ is optimal for r¤¤
¯ <p i <p ¤ and ri · ¯pi is
optimal for p¤ · pi · p¤¤:
Case 3: pi >p ¤¤
If ri · ¯p¤¤, ri does not a®ect ¼i.
If ¯pi · ri, ri a®ects both the volume of on-net calls and that of o®-net calls from
network j. We know, from the ¯rst-order condition (18), that ri = ¯pi is optimal.
In the case in which ¯p¤¤ · ri · ¯pi holds, the analysis is a little bit long. In what
follows, we brie°y sketch the proof. In this case, ri a®ects only the volume of o®-net calls
from network j. Then, the ¯rst-order derivative of ¼i with respect to ri is given by:
f(ri;®i) ´ ®i
·



















Let A(ri;®i) ´ ®j(a ¡ c0)+®ip¤¤ +[ ( 1¡ ®i)¯ ¡ ®i]
ri
¯ .
We ¯rst note that when ri = ¯p¤¤, f(¯p¤¤
i ;®i) · 0 since A(¯p¤¤;®i)=®j(a ¡ c0 +
¯p¤¤) ¸ 0. Let ®0 ´
¯
1+¯.I f®i · ®0, A(¢) is increasing in ri. Hence, ri = ¯p¤¤ is optimal.
If ®i >® 0, A(¢) is strictly decreasing in ri. Hence, either ri = ¯p¤¤ or ri = ¯pi is optimal.
34Consider now the joint deviation with ri = ¯pi for pi ¸ p¤¤. Then, the ¯rst-order
derivative of ¼i with respect to pi (keeping ®i constant) is given by:






which is negative since we have p¤¤ + r¤¤ ¡ c = 0. Hence, the pro¯t with (p¤¤;¯p ¤¤)i s
larger than the pro¯t with (pi;r i = ¯pi) for pi >p ¤¤. Therefore, without loss of generality,
we can say that ri = ¯p¤¤ is optimal for ¯p¤¤ · ri · ¯pi.
Hence, we can conclude that when pi >p ¤¤, ri · ¯p¤¤ is optimal.
Step 2. Choice of (pi;r i) given ®i
Case 1: pi · p¤
Without loss of generality, we can assume ri = r¤.
If pi · r¤¤
¯ , pi does not a®ect ¼i.
If r¤¤
¯ · pi · p¤, pi a®ects only the volume of o®-net calls toward network j. The
¯rst-order derivative with respect to pi is given by:





which is positive since we have
pi ¡ c ¡ a ¡ c0 · p
¤ ¡ c + r
¤¤ · p
¤ ¡ c + r
¤ =0 :
Hence, pi = p¤ is optimal.
Case 2: p¤ · pi
From the previous study of the choice of ri given pi, we have:
ri =
¿
· ¯pi for p¤ · pi · p¤¤;
· ¯p¤¤ for pi >p ¤¤:
Hence, without loss of generality, we can still assume ri = r¤.
Then, pi a®ects the volume of on-net and o®-net calls. From the ¯rst-order condition,
pi = p¤¤
i (®i)=p¤¤ is optimal.
Finally, when we consider both case 1 and case 2, given r¤, choosing p¤¤ is better than
choosing p¤ for every ®i. Furthermore, given that p¤¤
i (®i)=p¤¤, choosing ri = r¤¤ instead
of r¤ does not a®ect ¼i since p¤¤ ¸ p¤. Therefore, for all ®i, network i's optimal choice of
prices is given by: pi = p¤¤;r i = r¤¤.
Step 3. Choice of ®i
Since the optimal choice of prices is given by pi = p¤¤;r i = r¤¤, we are back to the
previous case in which the volume is determined by callers. From lemma 1, we know that
the symmetric equilibrium with ®i = 1
2 exists if a ¡ c0 + r¤¤ is small enough.
35Appendix 4
In the program of maximizing network i's pro¯t with respect to its prices given mar-
ket share ®i, we can easily see by checking the sign of the ¯rst-order derivatives that
fp¤¤
i (®i); b p¤¤




i (®i); b p
¤¤
i (®i);® i):
We now study the concavity of the program of maximizing network i's pro¯t ¦i with








































































(1 ¡ ®i)2b p
¡(´¡1)
i · ´(1 + ¯)c














This inequality holds for ¾ low enough. Therefore, the symmetric equilibrium with pi =
p¤; b pi =
c+a¡c0
1¡¯ for i =1 ;2 exists if ¾ is low enough and if a ' c0 holds.
36Appendix 5
We ¯rst analyze the connectivity breakdown with b p = b r = 1. In the program of
maximizing pro¯t given market share ®i, for any value of ®i, b pi = 1 is a best response
of network i to b rj = 1 and vice versa. We also know that prices are e±ciently chosen
in the market for on-net calls regardless of the value of ®i. Therefore, for any value of
®i, fpi = p¤;r i · r¤; b pi = b ri = 1g is a best response of network i when network j charges
b pj = b rj = 1.
We now examine the program of maximizing pro¯t with respect to market share when










This inequality holds for ¾ small enough. Therefore, for ¾ small enough, a symmetric
equilibrium with connectivity breakdown exists.
(a)( i) Suppose that a symmetric equilibrium (p;r; b p;b r;® = 1
2) exists. We ¯rst show
that for 1 >¯>0, if ¯b p<b r holds, then b r = 1.
In the case in which ¯b p<b r holds, b r determines the volume of o®-net calls. The
¯rst-order derivative of ¼b r
j with respect to b rj keeping ®j = 1





[b rj + a ¡ c0]+
·











f(b rj) is strictly increasing in b rj.I ff(¯b p) ¸ 0 holds, we have f(b rj) >f (¯b p) ¸ 0 for
all b rj >¯b p. Hence, b rj = 1 is optimal. If f(¯b p) < 0 holds, de¯ne b r0
j by f(b r0
j) ´ 0. Then,
¼b r
j(¯b p) ¸ ¼b r






j(1) ¸ ¼b r






is optimal to have either b rj = 1 or b rj = ¯b p. However, the optimal b rj has to be strictly
larger than ¯b p. Thus, b rj = 1 is optimal. Therefore, b r should be equal to 1 regardless
of the value of f(¯b p).
Consider now the case in which 1 >¯b p ¸ b r holds. Suppose that ¯ is close to zero and







f[e u(q(b p)) + (a ¡ c0)q(b p) ]+[b pq(b p) ¡ u(q(b p))]g for b rj · ¯b p:






f[¯u(q(b p) )+( a ¡ c0)q(b p) ]+[ u




f(a ¡ c0)q(b p)+[ u
0(q(b p))q(b p) ¡ u(q(b p))]g < 0 for b rj · ¯b p:
37Hence, network j has the incentive to choose b rj = 1 to have ¼b r
j(b rj) = 0, which is a
contradiction. Therefore, we have to have b r = 1 when ¯ is close to zero and a<c 0
holds.
(ii) Suppose ¯>1. What happens in this case is symmetric to the previous case in
which 0 <¯<1 holds. Suppose ¯rst ¯b p>b r. The ¯rst-order derivative of ¼
b p
i with respect
to b pi keeping ®i = 1









g(b pi) is strictly increasing in b pi. ¼
b p
i is maximized when b pi = 1 or b pi = b r. Since b pi = b r is
contradictory, b pi = 1 must hold.



















































































Hence, network i has the incentive to choose b pi = 1 to have ¼
b p
i(b pi) = 0. Therefore, we
have to have b p = 1 when ¯ is large enough.
(b) Suppose that a symmetric equilibrium (p;r; b p;b r;® = 1
2) exists. We have
¼
b p











(b p + b r ¡ c)qij:
From the network i's individual rationality constraint with respect to b pi and the network
j's individual rationality constraint with respect to b rj, each term of the left hand side
of the above equality should be non-negative. Therefore, at any symmetric equilibrium,
b p+b r ¸ c should hold. This implies that the only possible e±cient symmetric equilibrium
candidate is b p = p¤ and b r = r¤ = ¯p¤. We show below that this candidate violates one of
the two networks' individual rationality constraint.
In order to make network i's deviation to b pi >p ¤ not pro¯table, the ¯rst-order deriva-
tive of ¼
b p
i(¢) with respect to b pi keeping ®i = 1
2 must not be strictly positive at the point
b pi = p¤ and b rj = r¤, which implies
[(p
¤ ¡ (c + a ¡ c0)) + r
¤ ¡ e u
0(q(p
¤))] ¸ 0: (19)
In order to make network j's deviation to b rj >r ¤ not pro¯table, the ¯rst-order derivative
of ¼b r
j(¢) with respect to b rj keeping ®j = 1
2 must not be strictly positive at the point b pi =
p¤ and b rj = r¤, which implies
·
(r








38After summing (19) and (20), we have
p
¤ + r
¤ ¡ c ¸ 0:
However, we know that p¤ + r¤ ¡ c = 0. Therefore, both (19) and (20) must hold with












¤ + a ¡ c0)q



















¤ ¡ c ¡ a + c0)q








Hence, for ¯ smaller than one, ¼b r
j is negative and network j has the incentive to choose
b rj = 1.F o r¯ larger than one, ¼
b p
i is negative and network i has the incentive to choose
b pi = 1.
Appendix 6
Since it is obvious that ¦i(®i) is continuous, we show below that it is concave.
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Thus, if ¾ is small enough, ¦i is concave.










Hence, for ¾ large, ¦i is concave if a ¡ c0 + r¤ ' 0 and r ¸ b r(b p¤).
39Appendix 7
We only need to prove (c). For this, we will show that there exists "(> 0) such that in
the equilibrium associated with this ", social welfare is maximized and the ¯rms obtain
the monopoly pro¯t.
First, from the de¯ned rules for the regulation of reception charge, " must satisfy the
following three conditions.
1) g(p)=¯p.








2) g(b pi) · ¯b pi for all b pi ¸ p.
Since g00(¢) < 0 for b p>0 and g0(p) · ¯; we have g(b pi) · ¯b pi for all b pi ¸ p:
3) p · b p¤(= c + a ¡ c0)





Second, to obtain the monopoly pro¯t, each network should choose r satisfying the
following equality:































Third, the existence of the equilibrium is obtained when a ¡ c0 + r¤ = 0 and r ¸ b r.
E±ciency requires a¡c0+r¤ = 0 and r ¸ b r is a necessary condition for each ¯rm's pro¯t
to be larger than the Hotelling pro¯t under unit demand 1
4¾. Since there exists " that
satis¯es all the above conditions, we can conclude that if a¡c0+r¤ = 0 holds, there exists
an equilibrium in which social welfare is maximized and the ¯rms obtain the monopoly
pro¯t.
40